The fiscal cliff is very easy to explain.  What many in Congress and the press are saying we should do about it is more confounding.

If you were the sort of person who took expressions of policy preferences at face value, you would think that fiscal conservatives and deficit hawks would be ecstatic about this thing we’re calling the “fiscal cliff”—because contrary to our increasingly muddled popular dialogue, the fiscal event about which everyone is raising alarms is just a large and rapid reduction of the budget deficit (about $600 billion of spending cuts and tax increases scheduled for 2013).  Given the widespread deficit hysteria we’ve witnessed over the last few years, it is likely confusing to a lot of unsuspecting observers that so many in Washington and the mainstream press are dead set against this particular piece of deficit reduction.

The American public has been ill-prepared for this consensus.  We’ve been told, ad nauseum, that fiscal “stimulus” didn’t and doesn’t work.  But the case for fiscal stimulus is simply the flip side of a case against austerity that few seem to realize (or are willing to recognize) that they are making. continue reading…

Today Eurostat announced that the eurozone has plunged back into recession.  If you’re looking for a good explanation of the eurozone’s problems, you will only get so far by looking at the policy failures of particular countries.  The most fundamental problems—those that won’t go away with a mere shift in policy at the national level—are rooted in the very setup of the euro system.

In October, the Columbia Law School-sponsored series “Modern Money and Public Purpose” held a seminar that featured Yanis Varoufakis and Marshall Auerback on the design defects of the eurozone.  Varoufakis began his presentation with these lines:  “Greece is not important enough to be occupying the headlines around the world for three years.  Imagine a situation where a crisis in the state of Delaware was threatening to bring the United States of America down.  If that happened, then the problem would not be with Delaware, it would have been with the United States of America.” (video below)

Randall Wray on quantitative easing and the accumulation of reserves:

When the Fed buys assets, it purchases them by crediting banks with reserves. So the result of QE is that the Fed’s balance sheet grows rapidly—to, literally, trillions of dollars. At the same time, banks exchange the assets they are selling (the Treasuries and MBSs that the Fed is buying) for credits to their reserves held at the Fed. Normally, banks try to minimize reserve holdings—to what they need to cover payments clearing (banks clear accounts with one another using reserves) as well as Fed-imposed required reserve ratios. With QE, the banks have ended up with humongous quantities of excess reserves.

As we said, normally banks would not hold excess reserves voluntarily—reserves used to earn zero, so banks would try to lend them out in the fed funds market (to other banks). But in the ZIRP environment, they can’t get any return on lending reserves. Further, the Fed switched policy in the aftermath of the crisis so that it now pays a small, positive return on reserves. So the banks are holding the excess reserves and the Fed credits them with a bit of interest. They aren’t thrilled with that but there’s nothing they can do: the Fed offers them a price they cannot refuse on the Treasuries and MBSs it wants to buy, and they get stuck with the reserves.

A lot of people—including policy makers—exhort the banks to “lend out the reserves” on the notion that this would “get the economy going.” There are two problems with that. First, banks can lend reserves only to other banks—and all the other banks have exactly the same problem: too many reserves. A bank cannot lend reserves to your household or firm. You do not have an account at the Fed, so there is no operational maneuver that would allow you to borrow the reserves (when a bank lends reserves to another bank, the Fed debits the lending bank’s reserves and credits the borrowing bank’s reserves). Unless you are a bank, you cannot borrow them.

The second problem is that banks don’t need reserves in order to lend. What they need is good, willing, and credit-worthy borrowers. That is what is sadly lacking. Those who are credit-worthy are not willing; those who are willing are mostly not credit-worthy.

And we should be glad that banks are not currently lending to the [non-credit-worthy]. Here’s why: that’s what got us into this mess in the first place.

Read the rest here.

As Dimitri Papadimitriou recently observed, the overwhelming push for austerity in the United States is partly driven by the sense that deficit reduction simply cannot wait:

Many in Washington and the media are convinced that the recovery is well underway, and if spending cuts and tax increases are delayed for even a year it will be too late to tame inflation and tighten fiscal policy on a soaring economy. The urgency rests on unfounded optimism. We still have a very long way to go before the economy is anywhere near healthy enough to heat up. The GDP is now, and has long been, far below trend.

Here’s how Papadimitriou and Greg Hannsgen illustrate the point in a recent policy brief:

It is rather odd to be concerned about deficit reduction coming “too late” (i.e. that the black line will rise above the pink line), given how far we are from the historical growth trend.  As Papadimitriou and Hannsgen put it:  “Based on the present state of the economy, any notion that implementing better policy would be mostly a matter of precise timing is patently absurd.  The gap between recent real GDP growth and the historical trend is so large that the danger of overshooting the trend is hard to imagine.”*

Many proposals in this budget battle, including some coming from alleged “deficit doves,” call for replacing the fiscal cliff (over $500 billion in deficit reduction in 2013 alone) with what is essentially a different austerity package spread out over a longer time frame (the consensus target seems to be about $4 trillion of deficit reduction over ten years), otherwise referred to as a “grand bargain” in the media.  But notice that even if we continue on our current austerity-lite path (that is to say, without the fiscal cliff and without a grand bargain), and we continue to add jobs at roughly the same rate we’ve been adding them lately, we likely won’t be back to full employment for ten years. continue reading…

An upcoming Levy Institute conference:

From November 26 to 27, the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College will gather top policymakers, economists, and analysts at the Hyman P. Minsky Conference on Financial Instability to gain a better understanding of the causes of financial instability and its implications for the global economy. The conference will address the challenge to global growth affected by the eurozone debt crisis; the impact of the credit crunch on economic and financial markets; the larger implications of government deficits and the debt crisis for U.S., European, and Asian economic policy; and central bank independence and financial reform.  Organized by the Levy Economics Institute and ECLA of Bard with support from the Ford Foundation, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Deutsche Bank AG, the conference will take place Monday and Tuesday, November 26 to 27, in Frederick Hall, 4th fl., Deutsche Bank AG, Unter den Linden 13–15, Berlin.

A full schedule and list of participants can be found here.

Last month, numbers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics suggested that the years-long decline in public employment had finally halted, but Friday’s BLS report revealed that we moved back into negative territory in October:  the public sector as a whole (federal, state, and local) shrank by 13,000 jobs.  This should serve as another reminder that a significant part of this jobs crisis is self-inflicted.  There is a lot of policy work that needs to be done to help bring the economy back to full employment, but one of the baby steps the government can take in dealing with the crisis is this:  stop firing so many people.

Here’s Floyd Norris back in August, writing about a fact that has received far too little attention in our civic dialogue:

Employment in state and local government peaked at a seasonally adjusted 19.8 million workers in August 2008. Since then, the total is down by 697,000, or 3.5 percent. Since World War II, the only comparable decline was in 1950 and 1951, when payrolls fell by 3.7 percent.

The recession left state and local governments, where most government jobs are located, in a very real budget bind, leading to a rate of layoffs unprecedented in over half a century.  While the federal government also saw its revenues drop precipitously when the recession hit, unlike states and municipalities, it is currently under no economic constraint to balance its budget. The Recovery Act (ARRA) provided some aid to states and municipalities to help cover their budget shortfalls, but it was clearly insufficient, and now that the American Jobs Act (which featured further aid to states) has disappeared from the public radar there is little reason to believe that more help is on the horizon.  In fact, despite all the fiscal space the federal government has at its disposal, a large(r) dose of federal austerity is scheduled for 2013 that will do even more damage to public payrolls (here’s one estimate of the damage from the Congressional Research Service).

To put public job creation or preservation back on the policy radar, to begin forming a public consensus around rebuilding the public sector workforce (or just halting its demolition), there has to be some widespread acceptance of the fact that government has, in this particular sense, shrunk—and shrunk significantly—over the last four years.  From a purely rhetorical standpoint, the case for direct job creation, or aid to states for direct job preservation, should be a relatively straightforward argument to present to the public (compared to, say, something like quantitative easing).  But the task is made much more difficult if we’re making the arguments in a context in which everyone knows that government has become bloated during President Obama’s time in office. continue reading…

Many of the themes in fiscal policy, economic growth, and distribution that we have been working on here have been in the news lately. Scholars from many fields are weighing in. One common theme is dynamics and their importance:

1)      Evidence of a self-reinforcing fiscal trap in operation in Britain, forwarded by the NIESR, a British think tank:  Dawn Holland and Jonathan Portes argue today in Vox that in the UK austerity has led to higher debt-to-GDP ratios, defying the predictions of orthodox macro models. For something from our Institute on the topic of fiscal traps, including the UK example, you might take a look at this public policy brief from Dimitri Papadimtriou and me, posted just last week.

It is important to keep in mind, as the authors of the British study point out, that fiscal austerity is hardly the only cause of the economic crises now underway in much of the world. For example, they get at the problem of coordinating macro policies in a group of open economies. Above this paragraph is a diagram from our brief, illustrating, among other things, the role of Minskyan financial fragility in generating crises in many places in the world. This role is shown by the light green arrows in the diagram, which show how rising numbers of “Ponzi units,” (firms and households that need to borrow in order to make their interest payments) can play a role in a fiscal trap. Spending cuts or tax increases are sometimes “self-defeating” in this view because they undermine the tax base—the amount of activity subject to taxation. The mechanism involved is a Keynesian multiplier effect. Internationally, there are many examples of this problem these days.

2)      More on models of economic growth and income distribution and their relationship to models from applied mathematics in letters to the editor of the Financial Times (here and here) and in a blog post from a mathematician: The FT letters discuss, among other things, the perhaps debatable role of unemployment in keeping real wages from rising. On the other hand, the blog post discusses various kinds of discontinuous dynamic behavior that fall under the rubric of catastrophe theory, mentioning a classic business-cycle model by Nicholas Kaldor and various sorts of straws that break camels’ backs. Author Steven Strogatz notes that “in some…cases (boiling water, optical patterns), the picture from catastrophe theory agrees rigorously with observation. But when applied to economics, sleep, ecology, or sociology, its more like the camel story—a stylized scenario that shouldn’t be taken for more than it is: a speculation, a hint of something deeper, a glimpse into the darkness.”

All of these ideas play a role in numerous macroeconomic models, including the one that I discussed in this post, which features CDF interactive graphics. New macro team hire Michalis Nikiforos has been working on many of these issues, too.

Research associate Stephanie Kelton made an appearance on Harry Shearer’s “Le Show” over the weekend.  In the interview they managed to cover just about all of the major themes related to the debt and deficit anxiety that commands our civic dialogue (solvency constraints, inflation, interest rates, the gold standard, and so on; all the greatest hits).

Kelton gave a particularly concise response to the claim that we are leaving ourselves at the mercy of China when we run up public debt.  Kelton explained that the Chinese are not the main holders of US government debt (not by a long shot), and that their holdings are not some nefarious long-term blackmail setup, but basically a function of China’s export-led growth strategy (this segment begins around the 21:40 mark):

[W]hen the Chinese send us more goods and services than we send them, they end up with US dollars. … So, we get the stuff, and they get the credit to their bank accounts.  Now, what they do is they say “we have all these US dollars in our bank account, but they don’t pay us any interest, so why don’t we flip these out of our checking account into our savings account,” which is basically what the US Treasury is to them …  They get interest, and because the US government is only promising to pay US dollars, and because it’s the issuer of the US dollar and it can never run out, it can always pay the interest, it can always pay back the principal …  So they just keep flipping it back and forth from checking into saving, all the while, they’re toiling away the day in conditions none us would want to be working in, producing things … sending them to us to enjoy.  And what do they get in return? They get more credits to their checking account that they flip into their savings account.  And we act like they’re winning and we’re losing, and we send convoys of high level government officials over there to tell them to stop allowing us to abuse them this way.

Listen to or download the full podcast here.

Harry Shearer also mentioned Stephanie Kelton’s appearance, and those of several other Levy Insititute scholars, at the “Modern Money and Public Purpose” seminar series organized by the Columbia University law school.  Next Tuesday (Nov. 13, conditions permitting) will feature Jan Kregel and John T. Harvey on “Debt, Deficits or Unemployment? Identifying Real Threats to Growth.”

An announcement from the Levy Institute:

Starting in fall 2013, the Levy Economics Institute will begin offering the Master of Science in Economic Theory and Policy, a two-year degree program designed to meet the preprofessional needs of undergraduates in economics and finance. Headed by Senior Scholar and Program Director Jan Kregel, this innovative program draws on the expertise of Institute scholars and select Bard College faculty, and emphasizes empirical and policy analysis through specialization in one of four key research areas: macroeconomic theory, policy, and modeling; monetary policy and financial structure; distribution of income, wealth, and well-being, including gender equality and time poverty; and employment and labor markets.

The Levy Economics Institute Master of Science in Economic Theory and Policy degree program offers students a marketable set of skills and a strong understanding of economic and policy models at both the macro and micro levels, with direct application to a broad range of career paths. Thanks to the close links between our research agenda and the program’s core curriculum, students experience graduate education as a practicum, and all students participate in a graduate research assistantship at the Institute. There is also a 3+2 dual-degree option for undergraduates that leads to both a BA and the MS in five years.

For more information, visit www.bard.edu/levyms.

Breezily blaming the eurozone crisis on government profligacy is a widely-used journalistic shortcut, but by now it should be clear that it’s a shortcut that doesn’t help us understand what went wrong with the euro project.  It has been repeated often, though evidently not often enough, that Spain, one of the hardest hit countries, had a public debt-to-GDP ratio that was a mere 27 percent before the crisis hit.  And there is reason to believe that even in the case of Greece, the bogeyman of government profligacy, the popular narrative should be treated with a little more skepticism.

In a new report, Dimitri Papadimitriou, Gennaro Zezza, and Vincent Duwicquet use the “financial balances” approach pioneered by Wynne Godley to look at the recent history and future prospects of growth for the Greek economy.  Their analysis of the government accounts includes this graph: continue reading…